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Cipher Telegram

Dated 7 p.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Foreign Office Cable #4490, 4492

Charge of U. S. Affairs Dept.

To Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

On Enlightening the Government and People of the United States

No. 68 Strictly Confidential.

During the recent interpellations in the Diet, the present Foreign Minister expressed our attitude and determination in a straightforward way to urge reconsideration on the part of the United States, and is making efforts to make it clear that our national resources have not been so much used up. On your arrival at your post please make continuous effort to make the President and the leading members in the Government and among the people know the Japan's real intention thoroughly, explaining to them fully, as you think fit, the following points.

1. It is the inherent mission of both Japan and the U.S.A. to rescue modern civilization from catastrophe and bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific, and it is our duty to cooperate with each other to accomplish this mission. On the basis of this faith, Japan wishes for the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. But unfortunately, the American Government and people do not try to understand Japan's real intention; instead, they misconstrue Japan's action as a threat towards the United States. This is a grave and very dangerous /p. 2/ illusion, indeed. Japan is strongly determined to execute the already-fixed policy at the risk of the nation's destiny. So if America should believe that, on the basis of information, that there are still some people among the Japanese who are secretly opposed to the Tripartite Pact (of course, there are, but there are such people in any country); or, overestimating the exhaustion of Japan's natural resources due to the prolongation of the China Incident, a strong attitude on the part of the United States would easily cause a split in the public opinion of Japan or make us give in, it would be a ridiculous misconception and we are afraid that such a belief would bring quite unfathomable results.

2. The consumption of our national resources is true to some extent, but not as bad as is propagated in America. It is our national character to repel strongly any pressure from foreign countries, so if the United States should purposely obstruct our way, the Japanese Government and people will unite more firmly and determine strongly to accomplish the national policy, regardless of sacrifice. Suppose the United States should be in the same situation as Japan, the Americans also would probably see the same result as the Japanese. /p.3/ because in this point the American character is very similar to that of the Japanese. So the Americans should easily under-

stand such psychology and also the result caused by this psychology. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Japanese are very grateful to those who are quite sympathetic and have complete understanding towards them and at times will even make concessions or compromises under the circumstances, even if it is not logical. The intelligent public of America should take these characteristics into consideration.

3. There is not one person in Japan who wishes to fight against America. Should war arise between Japan and America, it would be America that started it. America has never yet gone into a war passively.

4. What does America expect to acquire by starting a war with Japan, anyhow? Does she wish to conquer Japan and wipe out the Japanese race? Surely there is no one in America who has such an idea. Even if they should have such a dream, it is absolutely impossible to actualize it. Supposing that America could subjugate Japan and enforce a treaty as relentless as the Versailles Treaty, Japan will break from the fetters of restraint within thirty years. An example / p.4/ is not far to seek. See it in the restoration of Germany. Japan has a unique national structure unparalleled in the world. She has tided over many difficult situations in the past under the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor. It is certain that the restoration of Japan would be accomplished far more rapidly and more wonderfully than in Germany. The Imperial Household is an everlasting source of our national power. Without understanding this unique national structure, it is impossible to understand the Japanese people. After all, a clash between Japan and America will not only lead to the destruction of the two countries where friendly relations should exist by nature, but also lead to the destruction of world civilization. America has nothing to acquire from it, and, when considered coolly, a war between America and Japan is most foolish.

5. If Japan and America should come to war, the Soviet Union will certainly make some move. And if Japan should be defeated as America anticipates, the Soviet Union will overwhelm the whole of China, communize it, and, gaining ground, communize the greater part of Asia. Would America welcome such an eventuality? If, by any chance, Japan should be defeated, the situation in East Asia would be alarming.

6. The Japanese foreign policy is based on the great idea of Eight Corners Under One Roof. Japan devotes herself to insure the peace and prosperity of the world. /p.5/ of course, Japan has not the least intention of attacking America, so we find it difficult to understand why America is engrossed in making military preparation against Japan. Japan and America should not be pitted against each other, but should cooperate with each other. However, not only are the American statesmen very inciting in their speech and action against Japan recently, but also their aim seems to be to build up a great army, big enough to make America the police of the whole world. This is not only a sad thing for the peace of the Pacific, but also of no advantage to America. America ought not to interfere in the spheres of other strong nations at random, but awaken to her own responsibility towards world

peace, and with the spirit of mutual aid and mutual concession, devote herself in tiding over the present difficulties and promoting the welfare of mankind.

Please send this telegram to Great Britain.

/1.7/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 12, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

London to Foreign Office Cable, '3639

Charge of European, Asiatic and Southern Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister Matsueka from Ambassador Shigemitsu

No. 9 ~~U~~rgent

1. Anxiety on the part of Great Britain is largely due to fear caused by lively discussion in Japan of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the southward advance and because she thinks that Japan intervention in the disputes between French Indo-China and Thailand is to acquire navy and air bases in these districts for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, and that this is concerted operation over both Europe and Asia after consultation with Germany.

2. There are some people who advocate that if Japan should acquire military bases in Thailand, Britain should regard it as a violation of the Non-aggression Pact with Thailand and to take military action against Thailand at once. Many reports are sent in saying that for this purpose Britain is concentrating troops on the Malay-Thailand frontier and sending in air-units. This is stimulating the United States, Australia and also Holland and other countries very much, but England, under CHURCHILL, is quite militant, and the situation cannot be easily predicted, connected with the war situation in Europe and p.8/ Africa. This has been made much clearer by EDEN's proposal on the 7th and the tone of the press of these days.

3. Japan should dispose of the China Incident at any cost. Especially if Japan could succeed in building up a foundation in French Indo-China, it is quite clear that Japanese power over Britain and the South will become more oppressive gradually. Therefore I would suggest that from the point of tact Japan should regard action without words as the first principle; declare clearly to Britain that Japan has no intention of encroaching upon British territory and also express her strong determination not to allow any country to interfere in Japan's negotiations with other countries. (Moreover, lay stress on the fact that what Japan wants to acquire is economical demands and that between nations it is impossible to close the door economically.) Also I consider that Japan should modify the public cry of advancing to the South, and first of all build up her foundation. Also I feel that it is very necessary that the Tokyo Arbitration Conference be concluded as soon as possible.

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/p.9/ Cipher Telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 13, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Batavia to Foreign Office Cable #3655
Charge of Southern Affairs and Trade Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUKA from Envoy YOSHIKAWA

Negotiation No. 65 (Strictly Confidential)

Cooperative relation between Dutch East Indies and the United States and Great Britain has become much closer recently as America's aid to Britain has become active, and the attitude of the Dutch East Indies towards Japan is nothing but the reflection of the attitude of the United States. It is difficult to notice such a distinction between them as is generally supposed in Japan. America's attitude towards Japan is growing worse even without Secretary of State HULL's speech at Congress. There is no room for doubt that the problem of the South Seas, especially of the Dutch East Indies, is an important cause for America's plan of a huge expansion of naval ships. It should be said that the real problem lying between Japan and America is not China but the Dutch East Indies. Regardless of the result of the Anglo-German war, the United States will persistently regard with hostility Japan who has ambitions towards the South Sea Islands. On the other hand the authorities of Dutch East Indies, consulting their own interests, desire to be in the hands of the United States rather than Japan. And besides, not only are they in such a condition that they can expect positive aid from both the United States and Britain, but also think that not even Germany will agree to the Dutch Indies coming under Japanese authority as a dependency so easily. /p. 10/ On the other hand, in the speech of the Japanese government against the United States and Dutch East Indies there is no consistent underlying strength, and finally it has given one the impression that barking dogs seldom bite; and the Dutch have begun to underestimate Japan's real power. Therefore it is natural for the Dutch East Indies to follow the attitude of the United States. At this time, then, when the United States is about to push on with her oppression against Japan, it is difficult to expect even unsatisfactory success from the Dutch-Japanese negotiations. Its breaking up is only a question of time. The acquiring of those thirteen items of necessary commodities will meet with difficulties. That is, the only means for Japan to settle the problem of the Dutch East Indies is by exercising her real power. Without this determination it will be quite fruitless for Japan to strive to achieve success by peaceful negotiations, shouting loudly for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

p. 11 Ordinary telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 18, Showa 16 /1941/

Received night, Feb. 19, Showa 16/1941/

From Ottawa to Foreign Office Cable #4130
Charge of U. S. Affairs and Investigation Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Ambassador YOSHIKAWA

No. 24

On the 17th at the reopening of Parliament, the Prime Minister made a speech on the international situation and also on diplomatic relations. The following is the main point of his speech on the relation between Japan and Canada.

There are some among the authorities on diplomatic and military affairs who believe in the possibility of a world-wide dissension occurring from Japan's attack on Singapore and Germany's capture of Suez and Gibraltar along with Germany's invasion of England. Recent statements of Japanese statesmen have given us an impression that the situation has come to a crisis, and some of those statements seem to confirm the possibility of Japan's southward advance. But the Canadian Government still hopes that the opinion of the moderate element in Japan will be adopted, but, in view of the speeches and action of the Japanese statesmen and the concentration of Japanese troops, it must not be overlooked that there are signs that Japan will be compelled to take an aggressive action at such a time as is most advantageous for /r. 12/ an aggressive nation.

Influenced by the urgent condition in the Orient, the anti-Japanese atmosphere in British Columbia has increased. Unfounded and irresponsible blame was put on the Japanese-Canadian, so that the government appointed a special committee to investigate the real facts of the situation on the Pacific Coast. A report and advice has been sent in, and the Government has acknowledged the report, etc. Details will be sent by official communication. Telegraphed to England and America and mailed to Vancouver.

/r. 13/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 17, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 18, Showa 16 /1941/

From Santiago to Foreign Office Cable #4048
Charge of Investigation and U. S. Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Charge d'Affaires KAWASAKI

No. 33 (Confidential)

Concerning your telegram No. 311 (On the collection of information concerning the appeasement policy of the U.S.A. toward Japan), in a meeting with Secretary Lyon, Son-in-law of Ambassador Grew, on other business, he mentioned that he had tried as had been indicated to him but that the Tripartite Pact was a death-blow to Japanese-American relations and that so long as this existed the United States could not change her policy suddenly and that his father-in-law was worried.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1150

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated 13-18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Series of handwritten Telegrams dated 13-18 Feb. 1941 between Foreign Minister and various envoys in London, Washington, and Batavia. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this
30th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Assistant, Chief Archives Sect.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
1st day of Oct, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity